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ABSTRACT 
Currently there are no sufficiently detailed and specific regulations and guidelines 
applicable to Floating Regasification Units. In view of the fact that these units are likely to 
become more popular in the near future, their safety needs to be examined urgently.  
'XULQJWKHGHVLJQRIWKHZRUOG¶VILUVWPHGLXP-sized floating regasification unit a qualitative 
risk assessment was carried out. Although the results are useful, they cannot be used for 
developing rules and regulations directly. For such purposes some detailed quantitative 
studies are essential. This paper addresses this gap and introduces a hierarchical system 
modelling method to overcome the problem of the lack of direct statistical accident data of 
novel systems.   
The method was implemented in IQRA (integrated quantitative risk assessment), a piece 
of software developed in-house for quantitative risk assessment. The safety of the floating 
regasification unit mentioned above was assessed using this software and the results were 
compared against the results obtained from conventional qualitative and the quantitative 
risk assessment.  
It was found that the qualitative risk assessment had a tendency to overestimate the 
frequency of the accidents but to underestimate their consequence, while the quantitative 
risk assessment based on the result of the qualitative assessment inherently underestimated 
both the frequency and the consequence of hazards. The hierarchical modelling was found 
to be an excellent method of dealing with complex systems with short operational history. 
 
Keywords: quantitative risk assessment, LNG regasification unit, FRU, system hierarchy 
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List of symbols 
AC                Area concerned (m2) 
AL                Cross-sectional area of leak (m2) 
CL                Discharge coefficient used for liquid (= 0.61) 
CG                  Discharge coefficient (=0.85) 
gc                       Gas constant (1kg m/N·sec2) 
MW              Molecular Weight (kg/kmol) 
NFEX              Number of fatalities by explosion (persons) 
NFFF              Number of fatalities by flash fire (persons) 
NFPF              Number of fatalities by pool fire (persons) 
NFJF              Number of fatalities by jet fire (persons) 
PA                Atmospheric pressure (Pa) 
PBW               Overpressure of blast wave (Pa) 
Ps                Absolute pressure inside pipe (Pa) 
PBPF              Probit corresponding to probability of fatalities 
POD               Population distribution (persons) 
PRF               Probability of fatalities 
PRF_PF                    Probability of fatalities by pool fire 
PRF_EX             Probability of fatalities by explosion 
QLR                     Leak rate for liquid (kg/s) 
QV                      Leak rate for vapour (kg/s) 
qTR                Thermal radiation (W/m2) 
R             Gas constant, 8,314 (J/mol·K) 
rC                 Radius of concerned area (m) 
t                  Exposed time (= 60 seconds) 
Ts                 Storage temperature (K) 
ȡLNG               LNG density (kg/m3) 
Ȝ                Failure rate per year 
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1. Introduction 
With the continuous increase of the world LNG trade reaching 241.1 MT (million tonnes) 
in 2014, LNG terminals are struggling with the problem of providing stable natural gas 
supply for power plants and industrial systems. As a consequence, demand for LNG 
regasification facilities has grown rapidly: the global regasification capacity at terminals 
was recorded at 724 MTPA (million tonnes per annum) in 2014, which was about 500 
MTPA higher than the level in 2000 (IGU, 2015). 
To meet the ever rising demand, floating regasification units (FRUs) started to be deployed 
at offshore sites in 2005 and, as of 2014, a total of 16 FRUs are operating with a total 
capacity of 54 MTPA across 11 countries (IGU, 2015; Victoria, 2016). FRUs are 
particularly useful for smaller markets where more flexible and cost-effective ways to 
satisfy the demand are necessary. 
However, LNG is regarded as a dangerous fluid possibly leading to several types of critical 
accidents, particularly fire and explosion. As a result, a joint project team consisting of 
Korean Register of Shipping and other stakeholders has investigated the risk of new 
compact LNG regasification systems to be fitted on a medium-sized FRU by means of a 
hazard and operability (HAZOP) study during the design of the FRU (Lee, 2016). The 
study found that the risk level of fire/explosion initiated by leaks from the process 
equipment is unacceptably high, and safety recommendations were made for installing 
appropriate number of gas detectors working together with automatic leakage isolation 
mechanisms near three major systems: the LNG tank, the boil off gas (BOG) processing 
units and LNG regasification units (Korean Register, 2015). 
Although all the participants of the study agreed on the results obtained, it was recognised 
that HAZOP studies do have inherent limitations. Firstly, it will be difficult to quantify the 
risk with high credibility, and, secondly, it relies on H[SHUWV¶opinion too much, possibly 
leading to personal biases and consequent misjudgement (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). As 
a result, this HAZOP study concluded with a recommendation that a careful examination 
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be carried out to determine the appropriate number of gas detection systems required for 
each system. 
This paper addresses the shortcomings of HAZOP studies and conventional selective 
quantitative risk assessment by investigating the safety of the FRU using an enhanced 
framework for quantitative risk assessment using an in-house software based on 
hierarchical system modelling. 
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2. Approaches Adopted 
2.1. Background 
In general, risk assessment can be carried out qualitatively and/or quantitatively (Rausand 
and Høyland, 2004). HAZOP is a typical qualitative approach and the framework used for 
a HAZOP study on the regasification unit (Korean Register, 2015) is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The main aim of the study was to identify potential hazards associated with the LNG 
regasification unit fitted on an FRU, and to provide recommendations for enhancing the 
safety of the FRU in question if and where deemed necessary. It used a combination of 
HAZOP parameters (flow temperature, pressure and level) and guide words (µno¶, µless¶, 
µmore¶ and µreverse¶) to identify assorted hazards. The degree of frequency and 
consequence for the identified hazards was then assessed based on the experience and 
judgement of the expert panel. 
Fig. 1. Qualitative risk assessment framework (Applied HAZOP method) (Lee, 2016; Rausand and 
Høyland, 2004). 
 
There are many more examples of qualitative studies on LNG systems. For example, 
Tugnoli et al. (2010) performed the safety assessment of LNG regasification systems 
onshore, concluding that advanced tools are required for investigating the safety levels of 
LNG plants more systematically. Nicola et al. (2015) identified potential hazards associated 
with LNG regasification plants in a qualitative way. They highlighted the lack of 
experience as the key limitation of the qualitative method. Giardina and Morale (2015) 
have carried out a qualitative risk assessment by combining an FMECA and HAZOP 
methods to investigate the safety of LNG regasification plant. Like other qualitative studies, 
the risk of the proposed plant had been determined based on the knowledge of experts. 
Similar to HAZOP, hazard identification study (HAZID), failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA) and What-if analysis are widely acknowledged as cheap and simple qualitative 
risk assessment methods where a qualitative risk matrix is often used to measure the levels 
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of likelihood and severity. In all these methods the risk is determined by combining the 
severity of its impact with the likelihood of its occurrence (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). 
They rely heavily on expert judgment and experience, and this may prove problematic 
when assessing the risk of systems for which there is lack of knowledge and experiences 
(Vinnem, 2007; Nicola et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there is no denying that there are some 
advantages in using qualitative risk assessment methods. 
For more stringent safety investigations, however, a quantitative method through which 
frequency and consequence of unwanted events can be quantified based on reliable 
statistics and analytical/computer-aided calculations will be necessary (Rausand and 
Høyland, 2004). On the other hand, for complex systems having a number of equipment 
working at different operating conditions, the industry often uses µVHOHFWLYH¶TXDQWLWDWLYH
risk assessment which examines only the risks associated with particular scenarios, 
operating conditions or sub-systems which are pre-identified as critical or hazardous 
through qualitative studies. Spouge (1999) and Vinnem (2007) have outlined general 
guidance of quantitative risk assessment applicable to offshore oil and gas units. Likewise, 
there are some example studies (Dan et al., 2014; ISO, 2015) using this framework as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. In this framework, qualitative risk assessment is preceded in order to 
identify critical parts of systems before µVHOHFWLYH¶TXDQWLWDWLYHULVNDVVHVVPHQW where the 
focus is placed on investigating the risk of the critically-identified parts. 
'¶DOHVVDQGUR HW DO  KDV GHYHORSHG D GHFLVLRQ-making tool to select an LNG 
regasification plant site. In this study, the feasibility of the plant site was determined 
through a selective quantitative risk assessment where potential hazards were identified in 
a qualitative way. Martins et al. (2016) also carried out a quantitative risk analysis of LNG 
regasification unit based on the selected hazardous scenarios. 
The selective quantitative risk assessment have been also extensively applied to complex 
LNG technologies in the variety of marine/offshore industries. For example, Jeong et al. 
(2017a) investigated the explosion risk of a high pressure fuel gas supply system fitted to 
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LNG fuelled-ships while Chae (2016) compared the risk impacts for different types of on-
board LNG liquefaction systems. In addition, Park et al. (2017) have evaluated the safety 
of structure of LNG liquefaction process systems for FLNG against the potential explosion 
and Kim et al. (2016) carried out fire simulations to determine the optimal position of water 
deluge systems for an offshore unit through the selective quantitative risk assessment. 
The selective methods, however, inherently rule out the hazards which are either 
unidentified or deemed minor, possibly underestimating the overall risk level. 
 
Fig. 2. Selective quantitative risk assessment framework (ISO, 2015). 
 
 
2.2. Proposed method 
Due to the short operational history of FRUs the statistical accident data is in very short 
supply. A method to derive the probability of failure of novel systems from the known 
historical data is, therefore, needed. Such a method was developed and applied to the 
current study. In essence, it breaks down the plant to be studied into components for which 
the historical data exist. The data for the overall system can then be built up by combining 
the component data. Not only does this method allow the use of existing data on individual 
components of the system, but it also enables the safety of the whole system be studied 
instead of concentrating on critical hazards only. A more detailed explanation of this 
modelling is as follows: 
A complex system is divided into several sub-systems according to a set of parameters 
(e.g. location and operating hours) as illustrated in Fig. 3. Each sub-system is then split 
into sub-groups in accordance with a further set of parameters (e.g. operating pressure, 
temperature, system size and fuel phase). This process can be repeated until the lowest 
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unit groups are components for which enough operational experience has been gained 
and accident data are therefore obtainable, such as pipes, valves, pumps and so on. 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed quantitative risk assessment framework.  
 
In this study, it was found that three-level hierarchy was sufficient to model the LNG 
regasification unit of the FRU. The risk of each group was individually assessed, and 
the risk of each sub-system was evaluated by summing up the risk of all its groups. 
The overall risk was then obtained summing the risk of all the sub-systems (Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4. Proposed process of evaluating the overall risk using the hierarchical modelling. 
 
The frequency of failure of an individual component (or sub-system) is combined with 
the impact of consequences (flash fire, jet fire, pool fire and explosion), completely 
independent of other components. 7KHUHDUHWZRW\SHVRIµFURVVFRXSOLQJ¶EHWZHHQ
two or more components: one is the probability of the accidents occurring 
simultaneously; and the other is an accident in one component bringing about an 
accident in another component. We can ignore the first of these because the probability 
of this will be extremely low, although there is a small possibility that the simultaneous 
accident produces a more severe consequence than the sum of the two accidents. The 
second cross coupling refers to the possibility of one failure escalating into a larger 
incident involving more than the originator component. However, we have already 
taken into account this type of escalation in estimating the amount of fuel leaked and 
accumulated in constructing the accident scenarios. Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to treat the components as separate isolated systems. We can, therefore, directly 
combine the risks of the individual sub-systems to obtain the overall risk of the entire 
system. 
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The major consequences of fuel leak can be economical cost, environmental damage and 
human lives. Whilst recognising the importance of the first two types, we have decided to 
concentrate on the last, thus reckoning the risk in terms of probability of human lives lost 
in the form of F-N curves. It means the overall risk of the entire system is sensitive to the 
density and distribution of population exposed to the potential hazards. Thus it should be 
noted that the overall risk of the entire system is not a fixed value but can be changed by 
the density and distribution of population. The hierarchical modelling when applied to this 
type of risk assessment can be illustrated as in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 An example of quantitative risk assessment using hierarchical system modelling. 
If the estimated risk for the entire system is unacceptably high, safety measures must be 
applied (such as gas detectors with automatic isolation function). The overall risk is 
reassessed with the new measures added, and the process continues until the overall risk 
becomes tolerable. 
It is thought that this approach will overcome the shortcomings and limitations of the 
existing qualitative and selective quantitative analyses. This idea was incorporated into the 
in-house integrated quantitative risk assessment software called IQRA (Jeong et al. 2017b), 
and the key data, parameters and models used in this study are discussed below. 
2.2.1. Frequency analysis 
In the event of a flammable liquid/gas being discharged through a leak, it may be ignited 
immediately, after some delay or not at all. Immediate ignition leads to a fire: a gas leak 
develops a jet fire while a liquid leak turns into a pool fire. If, on the other hand, ignition is 
delayed until the gas disperses, forming a flammable vapour cloud, an explosion (in 
confined or congested spaces) or a flash fire (in open spaces) may occur (Dan et al., 2014; 
ISO, 2015). In order to identify all possible routes to these final outcomes an event tree 
analysis (ETA) was conducted as presented in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. An event tree (Dan et al., 2014).  
 
The IQRA software quantifies the probability of the occurrence of the final outcomes by 
adopting the recognized generic data and models which are widely accepted for 
investigating hydrocarbon releases including LNG. In detail, the frequency of an initial 
leak from process equipment is analysed with respect to several representative leak hole 
sizes: 3 mm, 10 mm and 50 mm and 100 mm and full rupture size based on the DNV Leak 
Frequency Datasheets (DNV, 2012). The software also estimates the probability of ignition 
which is commonly determined by fuel phase and release rate; and a DNV model for 
immediate ignition as presented in Table 1 and OGP models for delayed ignition described 
in Table 2 were used in this study. 
Table 1 Probability of immediate ignition (DNV, 2013). 
Release rate (kg/s) Immediate ignition 
probability Gas Liquid 
Less than 1 Less than 1.2 0.0001 
    1-10 1.2-25 0.001 
Over 10 Over 25 0.01 
 
 
Table 2 Probability of delayed ignition (OGP, 2010). 
Release rate(kg/s) 
Ignition condition 
Gas  
(open deck) 
Gas  
(congested) 
Liquid 
0.1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.2 0.0011 0.0023 0.0014 
0.5 0.0011 0.0066 0.0022 
1 0.0012 0.015 0.003 
2 0.0022 0.0174 0.0042 
5 0.005 0.0213 0.0066 
10 0.0091 0.0247 0.0092 
20 0.0168 0.0287 0.0129 
50 0.025 0.035 0.02 
100 0.025 0.04 0.028 
200 0.025 0.04 0.028 
500 0.025 0.04 0.028 
1000 0.025 0.04 0.028 
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2.2.2. Consequence analysis 
The consequence analysis is carried out in several steps: calculation of liquid release rate; 
modelling of LNG pool spread and evaporation; and evaluating the impact of fires and 
explosion for each representative leak hole size. 
For liquid leak model, the initial leak rate of LNG is calculated based on the classical work 
RI%HUQRXOOL¶VHTXDWLRQLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIOHDNKROHVL]HDVZHOODVoperating pressures. 
With the application of the discharge coefficient, the leak rate through a leak outlet is given 
by Eq. (1) (DNV, 2013; Crowl and Louvar, 1990; Woodward and Pitbaldo, 2010). 
LR L L LNG S AQ =C A 2ȡ 3 3                   (1) 
 
On the other hand, the gas leak rate is estimated with respect to the two specific flow 
regimes: sonic flow for higher internal pressures and subsonic flow for lower pressures. 
For the gas leak model, Eq. (2) defines the pressure at which the flow regimes change from 
sonic to subsonic (Yoon et al., 2008). 
Ȗ
Ȗ
CR
s
P 2
( ) =( )
P Ȗ        (2) 
Eq. (3) is applicable to a gas leak rate at sonic flow condition: 
(Ȗ
(Ȗ
a
V L S
S s s CR
PȖ0:  3
Q =C A P      for
RT Ȗ 3 3G
§ ·§ · d ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹  (3) 
The leak rate of a gas at subsonic flow through a leak hole is given by: 
2 (Ȗ
Ȗ Ȗ
C a a a
V G L S
S s s s s CR
ȖJ 0: 3 3 3Ȗ 3
Q =C A P -      for >
RT Ȗ 3 3 3 3
ª º§ · § · § ·« »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹ © ¹« »¬ ¼
 (4) 
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To estimate the LNG spread and evaporation, the software adopts the film boiling model 
of Klimenko (Klimenko, 1981) EDVHGRQ1HZWRQ¶VODZRIFRROLQJTo estimate the shape 
of pool fire, the flame model derived by Thomas (1965) is applied. The radiation effect of 
pool fires with tilted flame by wind effect on personnel is estimated by means of the view 
factors for vertical and horizontal receiving surfaces given by Hoftijzer (1979) and Ramiro 
and Aisa (1998). In addition, the present study adopted Cook model (Cook et al., 1990) to 
estimate the impact of jet fire. 
In order to estimate the impact of flash fire, Gaussian gas dispersion models (Woodward 
and Pitbaldo, 2010; Perkins, 1974) were used in predicting dispersion effect and gas 
concentration. The software uses TNO multi-energy model 7 models (Woodward and 
Pitbaldo, 2010; Frank, 1980) for investigating the explosion impact. 
To quantify the adverse impact of pool fire (for radiation) and explosion (for overpressure), 
the probability of fatality (Pf) was estimated by probit models described in Eqs (5) to (7) 
(Jafari et al., 2012; Zarei et al., 2013; Mohammadfan and Zarei, 2015). Radiation exposure 
time (
et ) was assumed to be 60 seconds, equivalent to the safety guidelines from the Centre 
for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 2000). 
 
PF PF
F
PF
PB -5 PB -5
PR =0.5 1+ erf
PB -5 2
ª º§ ·« »¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
                       (5) 
 
For pool fire, 
4 3
PF TRPB =-14.9+2.56×ln(q ×t)                 (6) 
 
For explosion, PF BWPB =-77+6.91×ln(P )                  (7) 
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2.2.3. Risk assessment 
Risk is usually expressed in terms of lives lost and injuries caused by accidents. And, 
therefore, the degree of risk depends on human population distribution at the site. Using 
the calculation results from Eqs (5) to (7), the number of fatalities caused by pool fire and 
explosion are calculated by Eqs (8) to (9) (Zarei et al., 2013; Mohammadfan and Zarei, 
2015). 
 
C CA r
PF D F_PF D F_PF
0 0
NF = PO ×PR dA=2ʌ 32 ×PR dr³ ³       (8) 
A r
EX D F_EX D F_EX
0 0
NF = PO ×PR dA=2ʌ 32 ×PR dr
C C³ ³         (9) 
Flash fires are directional due to wind (evenly distributed in, say, East, South, North and 
West). Therefore, a quarter of the population (25 %) within the critical zone can be regarded 
as fatalities as shown in Eq. (10). 
     
C CA r
FF D D
0 0
1 1
NF = PO × dA=2ʌ 32 × dr
4 4³ ³            (10) 
Similarly, the direction of a jet fire depends on the positioning of the leak hole (say, up, 
down, left and right). The jet fires pointing up or down are less likely to come into contact 
with human bodies, and therefore only the left and right directions are regarded critical 
(probability of 0.5). For every critical jet fire, one quarter of the population (25 %) within 
the critical zone can be considered as fatalities as shown in Eq. (11). 
 
A r
JF
0 0
1 1 1
N = PO × dA=2ʌ 32 × dr
2 4 8
C C
D D³ ³                   (11) 
 
Finally, the assessed risk is shown as F-N curves (frequency vs number of fatalities). 
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3. Case study 
3.1. Description of the case ship 
The JSK FRU operating in Port of Benoa, Indonesia (Fig. 7) was selected for a case study. 
It supplies onshore power plants with natural gas after processing it using the on-board 
LNG regasification units and its principal dimensions are 46.0 m long, 12.0 m broad and 
5.0 m deep. 
 
Fig. 7. Case ship ± JSK FRU (by courtesy of JSK Shipping Co., Ltd).  
 
It has an LNG loading system and an LNG storage tank fitted on open space while the 
regasification units are placed in a partially-confined room, designated as the 
µregasification unit space¶. Two sides (starboard and aft) of the space are blocked by the 
wall structures while the other sides (forward and port) are open. 
The FRU was designed in such a way that LNG supplied by LNG carriers is stored in an 
LNG storage tank (IMO C type 400m3 tank). The storage tank help stabilize the pressure 
and the flow of the liquid fuel before the regasification process. The feed pumps transfer 
the stored LNG to the vaporizers where the liquid fuel is transformed into a gaseous form 
through heat exchange. During the regasification process, the excessive BOG (boil-off gas), 
naturally occurring inside the storage tank, flows by pressure difference to the BOG process 
system where the gas is heated by a preheater, before being compressed by compressors. 
Both the vaporized LNG (natural gas) and the compressed BOG are combined and 
transported to the power plant nearby. The regasification process is illustrated in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8. Regasification process. 
 
3.2. System hierarchy 
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Fig. 9 shows a simplified piping system diagram of the FRU topside process broken down 
into hierarchical groups. The whole system was separated into two sub-systems. The 
systems placed in open spaces were allocated to Sub-System 1 while the others located in 
partially-confined spaces were put into Sub-System 2. These were then divided into several 
sub-groups; the components were placed in the same group if operating conditions (in 
particular, system pressure, temperature, size and fluid phase) were identical. Fig. 10 
summarises the characteristics of each sub-system and sub-group, showing the list of 
components belonging to each sub-group. This process of system hierarchical modelling 
now allows the risk of each sub-group to be quantified independently, allowing the risk of 
the overall system to be estimated. 
 
Fig. 9. Simplified diagram of LNG regasification unit. 
 
 
Fig. 10. System hierarchy. 
 
3.3. Risk assessment 
 
3.3.1. Frequency analysis 
In estimating the system failure leading to LNG leak, the frequency of five leak hole sizes 
were used for each sub-group, making the total number of cases 20 for Sub-System 1 with 
its four sub-groups and 30 for Sub-System 2 with its six sub-groups. Fig. 11 shows the 
frequencies estimated as discussed in Section 2.2 earlier. The results show that the 
probability of initial leak depends on the equipment involved and their size. For example, 
the Sub-Group 2 in Sub-System 1 has relatively higher probability of LNG (or gas) leak 
than other groups. On the other hand, in general, incidences with small hole leakage is more 
likely to occur than those with larger hole leakage. For example, it can be observed that the 
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frequency of 5mm leak hole is 8.0E-3 /year in Sub-Group 2 while that of 250 mm leak hole 
is as low as 5.0E-4. The same trend is also observed in other sub-groups. Compared with 
Sub-System 1, the frequency of system failure for the sub-groups in the Sub-System 2 is 
relatively higher, especially for the Sub-Group 3 which has many more components than 
others. 
 
Fig. 11. Estimated leak frequency. 
 
In order to estimate the frequency of the final outcomes, each case of initial leak was 
subjected to ETA as discussed in Section 2.2. The ETA programmed in the software has 
seven phases: frequency of initial leak, immediate ignition, leak duration, ventilation 
system, delayed ignition and final outcomes. 
The scenario of limited fuel leak represents a situation where a safety system is immediately 
activated to isolate the leaky part of the system in the event of a fuel leak occurring. 
However, since the FRU as it stands does not have gas detection systems or any other 
relevant safety measures, the first iteration did not consider any safety measures, and 
therefore the leak duration led to the late isolation scenario. In addition, to ensure that the 
worst case scenario was followed sufficient leak duration was allowed: thus, the leak 
recognition and isolation were assumed to be delayed by up to 10 minutes (Dan et al., 2014). 
The case ship was designed in such a way as to make natural ventilation always effective 
for both open deck and the regasification unit space, thus obviating the necessity of a 
mechanical ventilation system. Therefore, the probability of ventilation system failure was 
disregarded. On the other hand, the congestion ratio was assumed to be 25 % for Sub-
System 1 (as one out of four directions was blocked) and 50 % for Sub-System 2 (as two 
out of four directions were blocked). For estimating the probability of delayed ignition for 
gas release, Sub-System 1 adopted the ignition model for open spaces, while Sub-System 
2 used the ignition model for congested spaces as described in Section 2.2. An example of 
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ET (3mm leak hole of Sub-Group 1 for Sub-System 1) is shown in Fig. 12. The other cases 
for both Sub-Systems 1and 2 also used the same process of ETA. 
 
Fig. 12. ET for 3mm leak hole for Sub-Group 1 of Sub-System 1. 
 
3.3.2. Consequence analysis 
The leak rates estimated using Eqs (1) to (4) are presented in Fig. 13. The results show that 
the main factors determining the rates are leak hole size, leak pressure and fuel phase. For 
example, the leak rate of Sub-Group 1 in Sub-System 1 having liquid phase with high 
pressure (3.0 bar) is notably higher than other groups having gas phase or low pressure in 
the same system. For Sub-System 2, Sub-Group 2 has the highest leak rate due to high 
pressure (9.35 bar) of LNG flow. 
Using analytical and empirical models described in Section 2.2, the impact of each accident 
(jet fire, flash fire, flash fire and explosion) was evaluated. The impact of each consequence 
is expressed as the probability of fatalities in accordance with distance. With pool fire, for 
example, 100% fatalities were assumed where the effect of radiation is 35.0 kW/m2 or 
above, while 50% and 10% fatalities are considered for 12.5 kW/m2 and 5kW/m2 
respectively (Jeong et al. 2017b). Therefore, the total number of fatalities can be estimated 
based on the density and distribution of population provided.  
For estimating flash fire, a neutral weather condition with a wind speed of 5 m/s was 
assumed in accordance with the prevalent annual weather records of Kuta/Bali, Indonesia 
(Windfinder, 2016). 
 
Fig. 13. Estimated leak rates. 
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3.3.3. Assessment results 
For convienience of analysis, the subject area was divided into several discrete zones 
according to the radius from the source: Zone 1 (below 5m), Zone 2 (5-15 m), Zone 3 (15-
25 m), Zone 4 (25-50 m), Zone 5 (50-100 m), Zone 6 (100-200 m) and Zone 7 (over 200 
m). These zones were then populated based on the actual data at the site as shown in Fig. 
14. It was assumed that the population was evenly distributed within each discrete zone. 
 
Fig. 14. Terminal population (by courtesy of JSK Shipping Co., Ltd). 
 
Using the population distribution, the number of fatalities was estimated for each accident 
using Eqs (3) to (10). The results are presented as F-N graphs as shown in Fig. 15. It shows 
the process of risk assessment using hierarchical system modelling as well as the overall 
risk of the whole system (summation of Sub-Systems 1 and 2). It is a common practice to 
show the upper and lower limits of tolerable risk on the same graph (Norway, 2000; Vanem 
et al., 2008), to allow judgement of tolerability of the risk. The range of tolerable level was 
taken from the IMO MSC Circular 72/16. 
The assessment results show that, although the risk of Sub-System 1 is well within the 
tolerable limit, the risk level of Sub-System 2 exceeds the limit, making the overall risk 
intolerably high. It was decided, therefore, that some safety measures had to be introduced 
to improve the safety. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Process of risk assessment and risk of overall system in F-N graph. 
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3.4 . Risk assessment with safety measures 
Given the result of intolerably high risk, an action to enhance the safety of the system is 
necessary. Gas detection systems fitted with an automatic alarming and valve cut-off 
systems were introduced for this purpose. A number of configurations were devised and 
the risk assessment was carried out for each. It was assumed that the initial leak is detected 
by the gas detector, not the crew, because there is no mandatory requirement for the 
presence of engineers at the site. 
 
3.4.1. Modification of frequency analysis 
An automatic gas detection system detects the presence of hydrocarbon in spaces where it 
is not normally expected and an alarm can be triggered when the concentration exceeds a 
threshold value. An emergency shut-off system is then activated to isolate the leak. The 
isolation can also be effected manually if the automatic isolation malfunctions. 
Taking into account these mitigation measures, a modified ET was developed as shown in 
Fig. 16. The limited leak scenario represents the case where the safety measures prevent an 
initial leak from developing into unfavourable outcomes. On the other hand, the late 
isolated leak scenario unfolds when both automatic and manual isolation processes fail.  
The failure of manual isolation can be caused by the failure of the gas detector or the alarm 
system, or the operator not taking or being able to take appropriate action when the alarm 
sounds. This leads to the emergency shut-off valve failing to close in time. Where automatic 
isolation is used, a failure of either the leak detector or the shut-off valve leads to the failure 
of the automatic shut-down. In both cases of failure the isolation of the leak is at least 
prolonged, possibly for some time. 
In order to examine the probability of the late isolated leak scenario, the present paper 
adopted FTA (fault tree analysis) method using the generic data about safety system failure 
from various sources as showin in Table 3. 
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The failure rate per year, Ȝ, was calculated from the upper failure rates given by the named 
sources. The reliability of each equipment was then estimated using Eq. (12) (Santamaria 
and Brana, 1998). 
( ) tR t e O     (12) 
 
 
Table 3 Reliability data for safety systems. 
  Safety system list Ȝ Reliability R(t) Unreliability 
(1-R(t)) 
References 
1 Gas detector 3.67E-01 0.6930 0.3070 (ORADA, 
2009) 
2 Alarm 2.50E-04 0.99975 0.00025 (EPRI, 1995) 
3 Operator to obey 
alarm 
- 0.97 0.03 (KletzT, 
1991) 
4 Cut-off V/V 1.86E-02 0.9816 0.0184 (CCPS, 1989) 
 
 
Fig. 17 shows the result of FTA when one gas detection system was used for the safety 
system (referred to as Case 1 hereafter) while Fig. 18 is for two gas detection systems used 
(referred to as Case 2 hereafter). It was found that the probability of the late isolation 
associated with Case 2 was 0.014, far less than Case 1 that was 0.113. Given that the 
consequence of the hazards are closely related to the leak duration, two gas detection 
systems will guarentee higher reliability to limit the leak duration, thereby reducing the 
consequece of hazards, than one gas detection system. The estimated probabilities of 
successful gas detection and appropriate action taken are applied to the ETs. Examples of 
modified ETs for Cases 1 and 2 are shown in Fig. 19. 
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Fig. 16. Modified ET. 
 
Fig. 17. FT for late isolation with one gas detector. 
 
Fig. 18. FT for late isolation with two gas detectors. 
 
Fig. 19. Modified ETs for 3mm leak hole for Sub-Group 1 of Sub-System 2. 
 
 
3.4.2. Assessment results 
The initial HAZOP study recommended the installation of gas detection systems into three 
points: LNG storage tank, regasification unit and BOG process unit. In this context, the 
idea of the present study is to investigate the optimum arrangement of gas detection systems 
from the safety point of view. Firstly, one or two safety measures was applied to Sub-
System 1 only and the risk assessment was carried out with the result shown below. The 
same safety measure was applied to Sub-System 2 only and the overall risk level was 
evaluated in the same manner. The results were then compared with the tolerable risk level 
to find out the optimum solution.  
 
Safety measures applied to Sub-System 1 
Fig. 20 shows the assessment results when the safety measures (both Cases 1 and 2) were 
applied to Sub-System 1. It is plain that this use of the safety measures did nothing to reduce 
the overall risk of the entire system. In both cases, the frequency of the entire system in 
accordance with the number of fatalities exceeds the upper limit of tolerable level in some 
areas in the graph. This result is as expected because the risk of Sub-System 1 was low 
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enough to be tolerable to begin with. This confirms that introducing safety measures to 
areas of low risk is ineffective.  
This result indicates that one of the safety recommendations from the original HAZOP 
study (i.e. installation of gas detectors with automatic isolation system at the LNG storage 
tank) would have been ineffective. 
 
Fig. 20. F-N graphs of risk with safety measures incorporated in Sub-System 1. 
 
 
Safety measures applied to Sub-System 2 
Fig. 21 shows the outcomes of the gas detection systems incorporated in Sub-System 2, 
suggesting that this addition to Sub-System 2 will be effective. In both cases, the F-N curve 
was seen to have been brought down to below the tolerable limit. Furthermore, a single gas 
detection system is seen to be sufficient, while two detection systemss lower the risk further.  
Given this, it can be concluded that at least one gas detection system applied to Sub-System 
FDQFRQVWLWXWH µthe appropriate number of gas detectorV¶ DVPHQWLRQHG LQ WKHRULJLQDO
HAZOP recommendations. 
 
Fig. 21. F-N graphs of risk with safety measures incorporated in Sub-System 2.  
 
3.4.3. Comparison with selective quantitative risk assessment  
In order to investigate the effectiveness of the hierarchical quantitative method proposed in 
this paper, the same system was studied using the selective quantitative analysis for 
comparison. Three accidental scenarios identified through the HAZOP study were used for 
this selective quantitative risk assessment (Korean Register, 2015). 
x Scenario 1 - Liquid leak between LNG feed pump and regasification unit 
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x Scenario 2 - Vapour leak from BOG processing unit 
x Scenario 3 - Liquid leak from LNG storage tank 
A leak from manual valves and pipes attached to the systems were reckoned as the most 
probable case through the HAZOP study. For a stringent analysis, the leak was assumed to 
take place at the parts subjected to the highest pressure and the biggest piping system. In 
this context, the list of equipment involved in Scenario 1 is identical to Sub-Group 2 of 
Sub-System 2 while those of Scenarios 2 and 3 are the same as Sub-Group 4 of Sub-System 
2 and Sub-Group 4 of Sub-System 1 respectively. The analysis results are summarized in 
Fig. 22 and Table 4. As can be seen, the risks of all scenarios are within the tolerable zones 
in the F-N graphs, implying that enhancing the safety of FRU is unnecessary. 
 
Fig. 22. F-N graphs of risk from selective quantitative risk assessment. 
 
 
Table 4 Results of selective quantitative risk assessment. 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Frequency of 
outcomes 
1.75E-4/year 1.21E-5/year 2.75E-5/year 
Consequence of 
outcomes 
Multiple 
fatalities 
Multiple 
fatalities 
Multiple 
fatalities 
Safety system Unnecessary Unnecessary Unnecessary 
 
This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the conclusions of the HAZOP study and the 
hierarchical quantitative assessment. It is to be noted that the risk levels obtained from the 
selective quantitative assessment are far lower than the results obtained from the current 
study. This suggests that the selective assessment can underestimate the risks of safety-
critical complex systems.   
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4. Discussion 
The history of FRUs is very short indeed, and consequently there is no accumulated 
historical failure data available. While there are many publications associated with the 
safety of LNG processing systems on-shore in chemical industries, only a few publications 
deal with FRUs. It is hoped that the work presented in this paper show a way of tackling 
the safety of FRUs.  
The principle of the hierarchical modelling method is a process of analysing and 
V\QWKHVLVLQJ WKH V\VWHP LV µDQDO\VHG¶ WR WKH FRPSRQHQW OHYel and the frequency of the 
V\VWHP LV WKHQ µV\QWKHVLVHG¶ IURP WKH IDLOXUH IUHTXHQFLHV RI WKH EDVLF FRPSRQHQWV :H
believe that this principle can be applied to any situation where the overall risk consists of 
multiple hazard factors such as collision, excessive ship motions, harsh weather conditions 
and human failure. 
The frequency analysis presented in this paper had to rely on available generic data 
compiled for investigating the safety of LNG process equipment in offshore and chemical 
industries. It is inevitable, therefore, that some of the quantitative results obtained from this 
study may not reflect reality. This may have to be carefully examined in the future, but 
effort has been made to be realistic using available data by breaking down the system to 
component level for which such data exist. It is thought that the hierarchical method goes 
considerable way towards generating realistic frequency data. 
It is recognised that the impact and consequences of accidents can vary widely depending 
on such factors as the structural arrangement within the FRU and the weather conditions at 
the time of the accidents. One way of dealing with this problem is to carry out the analysis 
for a number of conditions and attach the probability of occurrence of such conditions. Of 
FRXUVHVXFKH[HUFLVHZLOOKDYHWRXVHµVWDWH-of-the-DUW¶QXPHULFDOWRROVVXFKDV&)'DQG
FEA, to analyse the consequences. It is important to point out here is that this paper is the 
record of a generic study, primarily to discover if the current practice of safety or risk 
assessment is adequate and can be relied upon to identify high risks.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The present paper investigated the potential risk of the topside units fitted on an FRU using 
a hierarchical method. The results were compared with those obtained by the initial 
qualitative risk assessment and the selective analysis. This is summarised in Table 5. 
Table 5 Summary of study results.  
Analysis 
Qualitative risk 
assessment (HAZOP) 
Selective 
quantitative risk 
assessment 
Proposed 
quantitative risk 
assessment 
(with system 
hierarchy) 
Frequency 
analysis 
Up to once a year 
1.75E-4/year 
(Scenario 1) 
2.14E-3/year 
Consequence 
analysis 
Multiple major injuries or 
single fatality 
Multiple fatalities 
(All cases) 
Multiple fatalities 
Safety 
measures 
Appropriate number of 
gas detection systems is to 
be fitted to; 
1) Regasification unit 
2) BOG processing unit 
3) LNG storage tank 
Not necessary 
(All cases) 
Minimum one gas 
detection system is 
to be fitted to 
regasification unit 
space (Group 2) 
 
The initial HAZOP study identified fire/explosion caused by leak from pipe and valves as 
the most intolerable scenario, which may occur between once a year and once per ten years, 
causing multiple major injuries or a single fatality. It was recommended that the safety 
measures be independently applied to regasification unit, BOG processing unit and LNG 
storage tank. 
A selective risk assessment on major hazardous scenarios already identified by the initial 
HAZOP study was conducted. The results show that the risk of Scenario 1 with the 
accidental frequency of 1.75E-4/year was the most critical case. Although the consequence 
of fire/explosion was assessed as multiple fatalities, the estimated risk levels for all 
scenarios were found to be tolerably low, obviating the need for further safety measures. 
The present paper, on the other hand, assessed the individual risk of all sub-systems under 
different working conditions and, based on this, evaluated the overall risk of the whole 
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system. In this way no part of the system was allowed to be disregarded. The probability 
of the occurrence of an accident was 2.14E-3/year which is far higher than the one obtained 
by the selective quantitative risk assessment, but somewhat lower than the results from the 
HAZOP study. 
The outcome of the initial iteration suggested that some form of safety measures was 
necessary. It was subsequently found that one gas detector with the automatic isolation unit 
applied to the regasification unit space only is sufficient to bring the overall risk to an 
acceptable level. 
Last but not least, the present study also shows the hierarchical system modelling method 
as implemented in an in-house integrated quantitative risk assessment software is effective 
and can be used as a general investigative tool in the safety matters of complex systems.  
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